

Full Evaluation and Ranking/Grading  
Document of Three Top Candidates in  
the 2009 Afghanistan Presidential  
Election

Evaluation and Ranking/Grading Document  
Completed by the Foundation for Democratic



Advancement (August, 2009)

Purpose: Determine a ranking and grades for three main candidates for the 2009 Afghanistan Presidential election, in terms of the better representative of Afghanistan as a whole.

This determination is an outside perspective to give the citizens of the Afghanistan an informed different perspective of three candidates running for the 2009 Afghanistan Presidency.

The views in this Evaluation/Ranking/Grading are the views of the FDA. Also, the Determination is an example of a way to inform voters in the selection of political candidates--through evaluating, ranking and grading.

## The Three Main Candidates for the 2009 Afghanistan Presidency:

Mr. Hamid Karzai

Dr. Abdullah Abdullah

Dr. Ghana

\* Though there are 38 other candidates running for the Afghanistan Presidency, the FDA due to lack of information on the other candidates limited its evaluation to three top candidates. However, the study should give an indication of the quality of the candidates running in the Afghanistan Presidential election, and the legitimacy of the election.

The FDA and its members are in no way affiliated with any of the candidates in this study.

The study represents an independent assessment of three top Presidential candidates based on objectivity, transparency, and non-partisanship.

Due to the war-time situation in Afghanistan, the U.S. occupation of Afghanistan, and the close proximity of the U.S. government to the candidates running for the Afghanistan presidency, this evaluation is somewhat compromised in terms of accuracy of the information available.\* The FDA will do its utmost to ensure the accuracy of the information it uses. To do this, the FDA evaluators will censure information deemed to be rhetorical or lacking objectivity, and the FDA evaluators will account for the war-time situation and dominant role of the American government in Afghanistan internal affairs.

\* For example, during January 2009, Dr. Abdullah met with officials from the US State Department. In 2001, the US government and other western governments chose Hamid Karzia to lead a provisional government, and in 2004 under wartime situation and US occupation similar to 2009, Karzia won the presidential election. Since then, Karzia has worked closely with representatives for the region from the US, UK, Germany, and other western governments.

Moreover, the FDA is confident that its elevation results will give a reasonable picture of the quality (or lack of quality) of three top Afghanistan presidential candidates, and the legitimacy of the election.

Methodology for Evaluating, Ranking, and Grading of the Afghanistan Presidential candidates:

Evaluate the candidates as representatives of Afghanistan—backgrounds and visions, and incumbency record.

Evaluate the policies of the respective candidates.

Key policy areas to be evaluated:

Economy: (sound, fiscal management of public revenue and expenditure, and fair distribution of government expenditure to all sectors of Afghanistan)

Goverance (accountable, honest political representation of the Afghan people)

Social (sound social policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs of Afghanistan and makes economic sense)

Health: (sound health care policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs of Afghanistan and makes economic sense)

Education: (sound education policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs of Afghanistan and makes economic sense)

Environment: (more responsible, sustainable management of the Afghanistan environment)

National security: (sound, responsible use of the Afghanistan resources and military personnel inside Afghanistan lands.)

Weighting:

The eight sections for evaluation, backgrounds, visions, incumbency record, and five policy areas are given equal weight. The rationale for this weighting is that each section has relevant importance to Afghanistan.

Overall: Establish the basic priority of Afghanistan as a whole, and use the basic priority to evaluate and rank the candidates in terms of their backgrounds and visions, and incumbency record. The basic priority of the Afghanistan as a whole in terms of presidential representative:

Leadership—identification of issues and acts on them, vision, strength to carry through, strength to adapt, independent yet team player, and strong communication with public.

The FDA selected leadership because of the 2009 Afghanistan and world economic troubles, and an outstanding internal security issue—war with the Taliban and Afghan's resistance to the U.S. backed Afghanistan government and American occupation of Afghanistan.

## Methodology for Ranking and Grading:

Rank each candidate for the basic priority, and then rank overall based on a combination of the results for each candidate section.

The policy sections to be evaluated correspond to the basic priorities for policy:

1. sound, fiscal management of public revenue and expenditure, and fair distribution of government expenditure to all sectors of the Afghanistan;
2. accountable, honest political representation of the Afghan people
3. sound social policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs of Afghanistan and makes economic sense
4. sound health care policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs of Afghans and makes economic sense;
5. sound education policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs Afghans and makes economic sense;
6. more responsible, sustainable management of the Afghanistan environment;
7. sound, responsible use of Afghanistan resources and military personnel in Afghanistan lands.

Evaluate the policies of the candidates in each policy section based on a comparison of the candidates' policies in light of the basic priorities and comparative soundness.

The FDA's evaluation methodology has been criticized for being biased to certain candidates. This criticism though valid is not relevant because there is no absolutely objective evaluation methodology, and the basic priorities regardless of objectivity are bound to favor one candidate over another. There is nothing the FDA can do about the subjective elements of its evaluations than to strive to be as objective as possible.

Chief Evaluator:

Stephen Garvey, President and CEO of the FDA

**Principle information sources:**

Media articles and analysis of candidates. Candidates statements, including policy promises. Speeches by the candidates.

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# Backgrounds

## Hamid Karzai

December 24, 1957

Birth - village of Karz, near Kandahar.

1976

Graduates from high school, and then travels to India as an exchange student and is accepted by the International Relations and Political Science M.A. program at Simla University.

1983

Obtains his Master's Degree. Later moved to Pakistan and joined the Afghan resistance against the Soviet Union's occupation of Afghanistan.

1985

Serves as the Director of Information for the National Liberation Front led by Professor Sebghatullah Mujadidi.

1989

Formation of the Mujahideen's transitional government occurs, and Karzai is appointed as Director of the Foreign Relations Unit in the Office of the President of the Interim Government.

1992

Appointed as Deputy Foreign Minister in the Mujahideen government.

1994

Resigns from his position as Deputy Foreign Minister, and begins to work actively for the organization of a national Loya Jirga (Grand Council).

1995-1998

Believed to be supporting/working with the Taliban.

1999

- August: Hamid Karzai's father, Abdul Ahad Karzai, is killed in Pakistan (most likely by Pakistan's ISI).
- Marries Dr. Zeenat Quraishi

2001

December: Chosen to lead a provisional administration which was set up in Bonn, Germany.

2002

- June: Chosen as the President of the Transitional Government
- September 5th: Survives assassination attempt in Kandahar city.

2003

June: Receives an honorary Knighthood - awarded by United Kingdom's Queen Elizabeth II

2004

- July 4: Awarded the Philadelphia Liberty Medal in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
- September 16: Survives assassination attempt while in route to Gardez via helicopter.
- November 3: Joint Electoral Management Body of Afghanistan certifies the presidential elections and declares Hamid Karzai the winner.
- December 7: Took the Presidential oath of allegiance at Salam Khana Palace.

2005

- Honorary Doctorate of Letters from Boston University (May 22)
- Honorary Doctorate of Letters from the University of Nebraska at Omaha (May 25)

2006

Honorary Doctorate of Law from Georgetown University (September 25)

2007

- April: Karzai acknowledges meetings with Taliban
- June 10th: Survives assassination attempt
- September: Offers peace talks with the Taliban.
- October: Rejects Western accusations that Iran is working against Karzai's government and secretly supporting the Taliban.

2008

April 18th: Survives assassination attempt

2009

April 27th: Confirms that he willing be running for re-election on August 20th.

## Summary:

Education: MA in International Relations and Political Science

Political Experience: Formers Deputy Minister in the Mujahideen government, former leader of 2001 Afghanistan Provisional Government, former president of the 2002 Transitional government, 2004-2009 President of Afghanistan.

Professional Experience: Former Director of Information for the National Liberation Front,

Supplementary: Strong ties to the west—US and UK. Chosen by the west to lead Afghanistan in 2001, and wins election (during wartime situation and US occupation of Afghanistan) in 2004.

In 2003 received honorary Knighthood in the UK, and in 2005 received various honorary degrees from US universities.

## Dr. Abdullah

Former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Replaced by Dr. Rangin Dadfar Spanta in 2006. Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, son of Ghulam Mahyyod- Din Zmaryalay (Senator of the last period of Parliament) was born in 1960 in a religious family in Kabul. Dr. Abdullah graduated from Naderia High School in 1976 and went on to study ophthalmology at Kabul University's Department of Medicine where he received an M.D. degree in 1983. After receiving his degree, Dr. Abdullah served as the Resident Ophthalmologist at Noor Eye Institute in Kabul until 1985.

From 1985 to 1986 he worked in the Ophthalmology Hospital for Afghan Refugees in Peshawar, Pakistan and was also the Director of Healthcare for the Resistance Front. In 1986, Dr. Abdullah became the Special Advisor and Chief Assistant to Commander Ahmad Shah Masood, a distinguished figure in the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Occupation and the Taliban rule of the country, and served in that capacity until 1992. Following his service with Commander Masood, Dr. Abdullah served as the Director General in the Ministry of Defense in Kabul from 1993 until 1996.

During the years of 1996 to 2001, he served as the Deputy Foreign Minister and spokesperson for the Islamic State of Afghanistan. He became Foreign Minister in 1998. On December 22, 2001, during the Bonn Intra-Afghan talks, Dr. Abdullah was selected as the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Interim Administration of Afghanistan under then Chairman Hamid Karzai. In June of 2002, Dr. Abdullah was again confirmed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs by the national Loya Jirga, which was comprised of 1,501 selected officials from across the country.

Dr. Abdullah is fluent in Dari, Pashto and English and also knows Arabic and French.

Among the many people who have entered the current Presidential race, one of them is a familiar face: Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. A trusted long-time advisor to our national hero, Martyr Ahmad Shah Massoud, Dr. Abdullah served as Afghanistan's Foreign Minister after the collapse of the Taliban regime.

Dr. Abdullah has earned the respect and admiration of world leaders, and his own people, as a voice of moderation and consensus. He has consistently worked for peace and reconstruction in Afghanistan, as well as advocating the reform of government institutions. Dr. Abdullah says that there can be no greater priority than regaining the trust of the Afghan people, who have waited too long for a responsible government, one that puts their needs first.

For voters in Afghanistan who may not be familiar with his personal and political accomplishments, Dr. Abdullah's Campaign team has provided this review of his life.

### **Brief Biography**

Dr. Abdullah is the son of Ghulam Muhayuddine Khan from Kandahar province, who served as a Senator during the last years of Afghanistan's monarchy. Dr. Abdullah was

born into a devout Muslim family in 1960 in the city of Kabul. He completed his elementary education at the Ghazi Mohammad Ayub Khan School, and went on to graduate from Naderia High School in 1976.

In 1977 Dr. Abdullah entered Kabul University's School of Medicine, where he completed his training in ophthalmology in 1983. He subsequently served as a specialist at the Noor Eye Hospital in Kabul. In 1984, as Soviet occupation forces tried to tighten their grip on Afghanistan, Dr. Abdullah went to Pakistan to care for Afghan refugee families at the Sayed Jamal-U-Din Hospital. The following year, he joined the Afghan Freedom Fighters and served as the caretaker in charge of health affairs for the Panjshir Valley resistance front. It was there that Dr. Abdullah became an advisor and close companion to the country's national hero, Martyr Ahmad Shah Massoud.

From the early days of resistance to the liberation of Kabul in 1992, Dr. Abdullah's relentless efforts and devotion to the cause of independence for the Afghan people earned him national recognition. From 1992 until 1996 he served as the spokesperson for the Defense Ministry of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and subsequently served as the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Dr. Abdullah served as the caretaker of the Foreign Ministry for the officially recognized government-in-exile of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan from 1999 until the collapse of the Taliban.

After the Taliban's exit from Kabul, Dr. Abdullah continued as the Foreign Minister of the Transitional government of Afghanistan. Approved by the Grand Assembly (Loya Jirga), and within the first elected government, he continued as Foreign Minister until 2006.

Dr. Abdullah is married and has three daughters and one son. He is fluent in Dari, Pashto, and English, and is proficient in Arabic and French

Summary:

Education: M.D. as an ophthalmologist

Political experience: 1996 to 2001 Deputy Foreign Minister, 1998 Foreign Minister, 2001 selected Foreign Minister to Interim Administration, 2002 to 2006 Foreign Minister selected by the Loya Jirga.

Professional experience: 1985 to 1986 worked at the Ophthalmology Hospital for Afghan Refugees, Director of Healthcare for the Resistance Front, Special advisor and Chief Assistant to Commander Masood from 1985 to 1992, Director General in the Ministry of Defense from 1993 to 1996

Supplementary: Ties to the US through recent visits to US government.

## Dr. Ghana

Dr Ashraf Ghani grew up in Afghanistan before pursuing his education abroad. Like so many Afghans, foreign invasion and civil war led to the persecution of his family and forced him to remain in exile. Whilst abroad he became a leading scholar of Political Science and Anthropology and then worked at the World Bank where he learned the tools of international development assistance. Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001 he returned to Afghanistan seeking to devote his unique skills and knowledge to the task of rebuilding the country. He advised interim President Karzai and served as the Finance Minister in the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan until December 2004. During his tenure as Finance Minister, he designed a package of reforms and initiated several public investment programs that led to significant improvements in the livelihoods of ordinary Afghans across the country. He declined to join the new elected Government in December 2004. However, he remained an influential voice in the political circles both in Afghanistan and abroad.

### **Early Life**

Ashraf Ghani was born to an influential family in Afghanistan in 1949, and spent his early life in the Province of Logar. He completed his primary and secondary education in Habibia High School in Kabul. Growing up in Kabul under monarchy, where his father worked in various senior capacities, he has been immersed in politics from his early days.

### **Education and Early Career**

As a young man Ashraf travelled to Lebanon to attend the American University in Beirut, where he met his future wife, Rula, and earned his first degree in 1973. He returned to Afghanistan in 1974 to teach Afghan studies and Anthropology at Kabul University before winning a government scholarship to study for a Master's degree in Anthropology at New York's Columbia University. He left Afghanistan in 1977, intending to be away for two years. When pro-Soviet forces came to power, most of the male members of his family were imprisoned and he was stranded in the US. He stayed at Columbia University and won his Ph.D. there, with a doctoral thesis (Production and domination: Afghanistan, 1747-1901) and was immediately invited to teach at University of California, Berkeley (1983) and then at Johns Hopkins University (1983-1991). During this period he became a frequent commentator on the BBC Dari and Pashto services, broadcast in Afghanistan

### **International Career**

In 1991, Dr. Ghani joined the World Bank as lead anthropologist, advising on the human dimension to economic programs. He served for 11 years, initially working on projects in East Asia, but moving in the mid-nineties towards articulating the Bank's social policy and reviewing country strategies, conditionalities, and designing reform programs. In 1996, he pioneered the application of institutional and organizational analysis to macro processes of change and reform, working directly on the adjustment program of the Russian coal industry and carrying out reviews of the Bank's country assistance strategies and structural adjustment programs globally. He spent five years in China, India, and Russia managing large-scale development and institutional transformation projects.

Whilst at the World Bank Dr Ghani attended the Harvard-INSEAD and Stanford business schools leadership training program.

### **Work after 2001**

Following the ousting of the Taliban in late 2001, Dr Ghani was asked to serve as Special Adviser to Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, the UN Secretary General's special envoy to Afghanistan. In that capacity, Dr Ghani returned to Afghanistan and worked on the design, negotiation and implementation of the Bonn Agreement, which set out the roadmap for transition to a new government based on popular consent. During the Interim Administration, Dr Ghani served, on a pro bono basis, as Chief Adviser to Interim President Karzai and was among the first officials to disclose his assets. In this capacity, he worked on the preparation of the Loya Jirgas (grand assemblies) that elected president Karzai and approved the constitution.

### **Work as Finance Minister**

As Afghanistan's Finance Minister for the duration of the Transitional Administration, Dr Ghani is widely credited with the design and implementation of some of the most extensive and difficult reforms of the period. He issued a new currency in record time; computerized the operations of treasury; institutionalized the single treasury account; adopted a policy of no-deficit financing; introduced the budget as the central instrument of policy; centralized revenue; reformed the tariff system and overhauled customs; and instituted regular reporting to the cabinet, the people of Afghanistan, and international stakeholders as a tool of transparency and accountability.

Dr Ghani has combined personal integrity with extremely tough measures against corruption. When he became Finance Minister he fired corrupt officials from the Finance Ministry, ignoring those who threatened to take revenge. He refused to pay the army until they produced a genuine roster of soldiers, rightly suspecting that the figures were exaggerated so as to claim extra money.

Dr Ghani harnessed his knowledge of the international system to break new ground in coordinating donor assistance. He required donors to keep their interventions to three sectors, thereby bringing clarity and mutual accountability to their relations with government counterparts, and preparing a development strategy that put the Afghans in the driver's seat regarding accountability for their future.

In recognition of his services, he was awarded the Sayed Jamal-ud-Din Afghan medal, the highest civilian award in the country. He was recognized as the Best Finance Minister of Asia in 2003 by Emerging Markets for his efforts.

On March 31-April 2004, he presented a seven-year program of public investment, *Securing Afghanistan's Future*, to an international conference in Berlin attended by 65 finance and foreign ministers. Described as the most comprehensive program ever prepared and presented by a poor country to the international community, *Securing Afghanistan's Future* was prepared by a team of one-hundred experts working under the supervision of a committee chaired by Dr Ghani. The concept of a double-compact, between the donors and the government of Afghanistan on the one hand and between the government and people of Afghanistan on the other, underpinned the program of

investment in Securing Afghanistan's Future. The donors pledged \$8.2 billion at the conference for the first three years of the program — the exact amount asked by the government — and agreed that the government's request for a total seven-year package of assistance of \$27.5 billion was justified.

Throughout his career, Dr Ghani has focused relentlessly on poverty eradication through the creation of wealth and the establishment of the rights of citizenship. In Afghanistan, he is attributed with designing the National Solidarity Program, a program of bloc grants to villages in which elected village councils determine both the priorities and the mechanisms of implementation. The program has been rolled out across the country and has become so successful that other countries around the world are seeking to emulate it. Dr Ghani also partnered with the Ministry of Communication to ensure that telecom licenses were granted on a fully-transparent basis. As a result, the number of mobile phones in the country jumped from 100 in July 2002 to over a million at the end of 2005. Private investment in the sector exceeded \$200 million and the telecom sector emerged as one of the major sectors of revenue generation for government.

After the election of President Karzai in October 2004, Mr Ghani declined to join the cabinet and instead asked to be appointed as Chancellor of Kabul University. As Chancellor, he was engaged in articulating the concept of shared governance among the faculty, students, and staff and advocating a vision of the University where men and women with skills and commitment to lead their country in the age of globalization can be trained.

Dr Ghani subsequently founded the Institute for State Effectiveness, to help governments and their international partners to build more effective, accountable systems of government. As Chairman of the Institute Dr Ghani co-authored a book , *Fixing Failed States*, to international critical acclaim.

## Summary:

Education: degrees in political science and anthropology, MA and Phd in anthropology

Political experience: 2001 to 2004 Finance Minister in Transitional government

Professional experience: 1991 to 2002 lead anthropologist for the World Bank, 2001 special advisor to the UN's envoy to Afghanistan, 2001 to 2003 chief advisor to Interim President Karzai, 2004 Chancellor of Kabul University, founder of Institute of State Effectiveness, author of *Fixing Failed States*

Supplementary: Very strong ties to the US and western international organizations, member of the Atlantic Council of the US. Dr. Ghana wrote a report, "A Ten Year Framework for Afghanistan" which articulated the US position on Afghanistan. Hence, Dr. Ghana's independence from the US is in serious question.

## Backgrounds Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: sound background, including diversity, which allows that Presidential candidate to identify issues and act on them, strength to carry through, strength to adapt, independent yet team player, strong communication with public, and proven commitment to represent the Afghan people.

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
Education:	6.5/10	5/10	6.5/10
Political experience:	8/10	7/10	6/10
Professional experience:	3/10	6/10	7.5/10
Supplementary:	2/10	2/10	0/10
Totals:	19.5/40	20/40	20/40
Converted Total:	4.9/10	5/10	5/10

### Rational:

Education: none of the candidates have education in business or law; education in medicine not relevant to running a government.

Political experience: Karzai has the strongest political experience followed by Abdullah.

Professional experience: Ghana has the strongest professional experience followed by Abdullah. Karzai has very weak professional experience.

Supplementary: all three candidates' recent political experience is linked to the US occupation, and therefore the candidates' ability to represent Afghans is in question, due to a conflict of interest with the US and other western states and organizations. An independent candidate from foreign influence is more desirable than one which is beholden to foreign entities. Ghana through longtime strong links to the west is deemed to be the most beholden to western interests, and thereby less reliable to represent Afghan interests. For example, Ghana's ten year plan for Afghanistan is written from an American interest standpoint, and he has an US adviser for his campaign. All three candidates were part of the 2001 Interim government, which was formed by the US and its allies.

# Vision for Afghanistan

## Hamid Karzai

### National Development:

Continued dependency on foreign aid, assistance, continued foreign intrusion in Afghan internal matters

Work towards peace with Taliban

Strengthen the government

## Dr. Abdullah

Change Afghanistan—less corruption, better governance, transparent governance (says major donors and international financial institutions based on good governance)

## Dr. Ghani

### A New Beginning

In a recent report, Dr Ashraf Ghani outlines a medium-term strategy for getting things right in Afghanistan.

#### **A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan: Executive Summary**

Describing the situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan as increasingly perilous, President Obama has committed his administration to enhancing the military, governance, and economic capacity of the two countries. On March 27, 2009, President Obama announced plans to launch a new strategy in the region:

To succeed, we and our friends and allies must reverse the Taliban's gains and promote a more capable and accountable Afghan government. . . . Afghanistan has an elected government, but it is undermined by corruption and has difficulty delivering basic services to its people. The economy is undercut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the insurgency. The people of Afghanistan seek the promise of a better future. Yet once again, they have seen the hope of a new day darkened by violence and uncertainty.

The Obama administration has thus both defined the problem and set clear goals for American engagement in the region. Translating these goals into achievements on the ground, however, is going to require understanding the context, the lessons from the past, and the priority actions for the future. Conditions on the ground are now much more difficult than in 2002 when the Afghan people overwhelmingly welcomed the international intervention. The goals set, however, are still achievable if the needs and

aspirations of the Afghan people are the focus of renewed efforts. The administration has clearly recognized that the achievement of goals requires a medium-term approach. This report offers an implementation framework for translating the goals into feasible processes and actions in Afghanistan.

There are four major threats to securing Afghanistan's future. First, Al Qaeda is a renewed force moving fluidly between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Second, an expanded, well resourced, and multifaceted insurgency presents a continual threat to Afghan and international actors. Third, a narcotics production, processing, and distribution network fuels corruption and violence and is becoming concentrated in the hands of a few nefarious individuals. And fourth, poor governance, underpinning all these problems, is now so entrenched that many organs of government are seen as the instruments of corruption, not of legitimacy and the rule of law.

These threats have been heightened and perpetuated by the inability of the international community to develop a unified strategy or coordination mechanism. Securing agreement on a joint strategy and on the means for coordination is a prerequisite for success in Afghanistan. The tendency of the Afghan elite to support instability rather than institutional reform is another key obstacle. The political field in Afghanistan must therefore be broadened to allow for the recognition and emergence of stakeholders in a stable and prosperous country.

While there are significant constraints to achieving the stated objectives, there are also significant Afghan and international assets to build on. On the Afghan side, the assets are in the natural, financial, and human capital and the institutional successes in areas ranging from the national army to rural development. The success of the political process from 2001 to 2004, when the first presidential elections in the country's history were held, shows the willingness of the Afghan public to engage in democratic processes. The National Solidarity Program is one example of a novel approach that was deployed across a number of sectors. The success of its programs indicates that the key to institutional success is not context but the design of programs and the nature of partnerships between the Afghan stakeholders and the international community.

A coherent approach to state-building can produce a capable and accountable Afghan government. This report offers a prioritized approach to building state functions sequentially and in a way that creates self-sustaining linkages and reform processes. With a 10-year timeframe for achieving control of its territory and the allegiance of its people, the Afghan government can break down state functions into four institutional orders. This classification of functions will allow for a method of benchmarking and measurement and allow domestic and international actors to move from endless preparation of strategies on paper to the critical task of implementation on the ground.

First-order functions include the rule of law, to ensure that the Afghan state can control its territory through the use of effective security and police services that use force within a clear space defined by strict rules. They also include public finance, to ensure that resources, both internal and external, are channeled effectively and spent accountably at every level of government using robust national accountability systems. These functions involve administrative control, to turn Afghan territory into a hierarchically national

space in which the functions and levels of governance are clearly defined and coordinated while supported by capable civil servants. These will include human capital development, to create stakeholders in positive reform that have the skills to support an effective public sector, a legitimate and productive private sector, and a vibrant civil society.

Second-order functions include market-building, creating sustainable jobs that can draw in unemployed youth who provide the basis for the insurgency and the narcotics industry. This will involve developing key initiatives in support of agriculture, through a bold initiative that works from market access backward through value chains, supply chains, knowledge, and infrastructure and uses trade concessions and innovative financial tools to ensure sustainable and profitable production. It involves mining, through transparent licensing frameworks and credible arbitration and judicial enforcement of contracts. And it includes construction, which, through a central construction code, a central procurement authority, and a construction corps, could build on the private capacity in Afghanistan to truly transform the efficiency and sustainability of infrastructure development across the country.

Third-order functions include a focus on infrastructure, to consolidate territory, harness space, and release market forces using domestic and regional capabilities to build key roads, develop alternative energies and capitalize on new technologies while focusing on social policy, through rural programs that allow for generating wealth and developing social and institutional capital from the bottom up.

Fourth-order functions include public borrowing, to ensure that external resources can be channeled effectively in support of the budget as the central instrument of policy. They demand effective management of public, cultural, environmental, and innovation assets through credible contracting and regulation and the formalization of property rights. These functions also include second-generation human capital development, through a focus on tertiary and vocational training as part of a long-term, 20- year human development plan.

These institution-building processes can be justified strategically because they build on the successful state-building efforts under way in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005 and take advantage of the readiness of the Afghan people for good governance, the rule of law, and an end to violence and poverty.

The counter-insurgency (COIN) approach that is now beginning to guide American military actions in Afghanistan, as it has been in Iraq, also emphasizes a coherent and coordinated approach to good government to win public trust—to use force only when necessary in the short term and to avoid its use in the longer term. This is in line with the broader international thinking on state-building, which now emphasizes the centrality of governance and the cost of failure of disparate and piecemeal development approaches.

The coming months are central to Afghanistan's future for a variety of reasons. The new U.S. strategy can reach the medium-term state-building priorities outlined above through short-term actions:

- Ensuring a level playing field for the presidential elections in August 2009 and supporting a process through which Afghans can truly engage in constructive debate about the country's future.

- Developing a coherent international strategy, using the COIN manual as a basis for military operations and a Marshall Plan approach to simplify the actions of the broader international community.
- Preparing new national programs with implementation plans in place for immediate roll-out by the new Afghan administration.
- Using the National Solidarity Program, a community-level development program, as a platform for rural enterprise and wealth generation.
- Focusing on eight model provinces across the country, which provide a demonstration and multiplier effect for the rest of Afghanistan to underpin a slowly broadening area of good governance.

The situation in Afghanistan is difficult, but by no means impossible, and renewed international focus combined with shifting internal dynamics provide a real opportunity to change the trajectory of the country and the lives of millions of Afghans. The first step has been taken—a coherent U.S. regional strategy now exists. This must be translated into measurable medium-term goals that support a functional and accountable state. These goals must be underpinned by short-term feasible actions that can generate positive change and a sense of hope, both within and outside Afghanistan, that the future will be more prosperous and secure than the past. This is essential for Afghan, regional, and global stability.

The Atlantic Council of the United States, A Ten Year Framework for Afghanistan  
 The Atlantic Council of the United States promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international challenges of the twenty-first century. The Council comprises a non-partisan network of leaders who aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas by:

- stimulating dialogue and discussion about critical international issues with a view to enriching public debate and promoting consensus on appropriate responses from the administration; the Congress; the corporate and nonprofit sectors; the media in the United States; and leaders in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.
- conducting educational and exchange programs for successor generations of U.S. leaders so that they will come to value U.S. international engagement and have the knowledge and understanding necessary to develop effective policies.

Through its diverse networks, the Council builds broad constituencies to support constructive U.S. leadership and policies. Its program offices publish informational analyses, convene conferences among current and future leaders, and contribute to the public debate in order to integrate the views of knowledgeable individuals from a wide variety of backgrounds, interests, and experiences.

A Report by the Atlantic Council  
 Ashraf Ghana

## Visions Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: sound future outlook for the people of Afghanistan as a whole.

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	2/10	2/10	2/10

Rational: All three candidates' vision based on continued US intrusion in Afghan internal affairs, and promotion of US interests in Afghanistan. Afghan's interests are secondary. The score of 2/10 is based on that some marginal benefit will come to Afghans from continued US occupation and promotion of its interests.

## Incumbency Record

### Hamid Karzia

Accused of corruption by political opponents, but has never been convicted of corruption.

Has allowed the continuation of the US occupation of Afghanistan.

Has no control over the direction of Afghanistan—as the US and other foreign entities control the military and support funds.

### Incumbency Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: an incumbency record which demonstrates putting the Afghans' interests first.

Score            Hamid Karzai

2/10

Rational: Karzia has allowed the US occupation to continue, and he has failed to bring peace to Afghanistan.

He has tried talks with the Taliban, and he is committed to doing so in the future. Also, he has been accused of corruption, but has never been convicted of corruption.

Karzai was put in power by the US and continues to be controlled by the US.

## Economic

Hamid Karzai

Infrastructure and natural resources development

Air transportation development

Agricultural and rural development—micro-financing

Economic governance and private sector development

Dr. Abdullah

he plans to root out the problem among the highest levels of government using a zero-tolerance policy

Billions of dollars worth of reconstruction projects have been carried out in the past seven and half years in Afghanistan. The reconstruction projects which are mainly financed by the international donors cover projects in various sectors such as road, energy, telecommunication, agriculture, education, health etc.

Unfortunately, the overwhelming numbers of projects carried out so far have not been monitored and in many cases they do not meet the design specifications and conditions. That is why our roads after spending hundreds of millions of dollars are falling apart and after only two years need significant work and maintenance while roads built some 30 to 35 years ago are still usable.

Amazingly, the current administration under President Hamid Karzai never considered the matter seriously and over time reconstruction projects became the source of making black money for the corrupt Afghan and Foreign companies and individuals. No monitoring system was devised to check on the status and quality of the work being done by the contractors. That is why contracting companies without the fear of being monitored ended up performing work without delivering on the basis of design specifications.

A failure to grasp long-term goals and inadequate coordination among the Afghan government and international community tasked with providing expertise and financial means for various projects have hampered the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan cannot achieve the goal of reconstruction of the country without being able to provide a sustainable security environment on its own. Lack of good governance and rampant corruption within this administration has severely impacted the quality of projects. As an example, a project originally designed to be built for \$50 million is being built for only 15 to 20 million dollars after nearly sixty percent of the money is taken by the primary contractors and the corrupt officials. As a result the quality of the projects are severely undermined.

Recognizing the severity of the problem, our plan calls for the establishment of an independent monitoring agency to check and examine the status of the projects and to prepare and present quarterly reports to the president and the cabinet. All the projects will be monitored through a color coded database where the overall status of the projects in different sectors will be based on factors such as schedule, budget and quality.

In addition, projects will be monitored for their capacity building potential. Every project should have an inhibited capacity building element. Lack of capacity is one of the most serious problems facing the country. Thus, we will make sure that in every project worth more than one million dollars we include the capacity building element in the contract.

Due to the significance of the monitoring agency, this agency will be headed by a well qualified manager and engineers. We will make sure that the independence of the agency is well protected and that the agency can not be pressurized by the government agencies. We believe that by monitoring the projects not only the projects can be saved from low quality work and mismanagement, but also help fight corruption.

*We will make sure that projects are prioritized based on the absolute needs of the people and are carried out in a safe environment with the highest quality possible.*

**We are determined to monitor projects, reduce corruption and restore legitimacy of the government so that it can better take on the task of rebuilding!**

## Dr. Ghana

Afghanistan's plentiful fallow land and abundant reserves of fresh water hold the potential to turn agriculture into a booming national industry. Unfortunately, agriculture has been dangerously neglected to the point that rural farmers choose to harvest opium instead of crops.

Investing in power is a pre-requisite for modernizing agriculture. Micro-hydro schemes can quickly address these problem, while larger grids are laid down for the long-term. Next we need to building transportation and storage infrastructure, improve knowledge and increase the availability of financing to food producers.

The government also needs to modernize animal husbandry practices so that meat and animal by-products can become growth industries for herders and nomads. Building the national market and then access to regional and international markets for these products will then do the critical heavy-lifting by boosting demand.

NATO forces provide a large and immediate local market for Afghan produce. Neighboring countries like Iran and the Gulf states, which import the majority of their food, can also become strong regional trade partners, both as consumers and as investors. Small concessions from the international markets like the European Union can also provide an enormous stimulus for Afghan agriculture.

With careful management, Afghan beef, wheat, maize, almonds, apricots and more can supply global markets in 2-3 years.

**Dr. Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai campaigned in Kabul today, promoting his policies for economic growth and women’s issues at events hosted by the Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce & Industries and Afghan Women’s Network.**

Dr. Ghani described his plans for economic growth and development, which he laid out in his Dari and Pashto language book “A Beacon Towards a Just Order,” a new full-length description of all of his policy proposals. The issues covered include: Afghan nationalism and Islam, nation-building, infrastructure, good governance, education, international relations and economic reforms, including job creation, trade and transparency.

**Economic Evaluation:**

Basis for evaluation: sound, fiscal management of public revenue and expenditure, and fair distribution of government expenditure to all sectors of Afghanistan

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	1/10	2/10	2/10

Rational: Karzai’s economic policies are model of America’s interests, including exploitation of Afghan’s natural resources and geographic location. Abdullah’s economic policy is the same, except with emphasis on less government corruption and more managed development policy. Ghana’s economic policy is the most detailed, but again is a blueprint for America’s interests in Afghanistan. All three candidates fail to have a economic policy which is based on the Afghan people’s interests.

# Governance

## Hamid Karzai

Anti-corruption, prosecutions, merit based appointments  
National assembly, Constitution

## Dr. Abdullah Abdullah

Set up a parliamentary system.

Today, the state of governance in Afghanistan is in disarray. Not only the leadership of this administration, under President Hamid Karzai, does not believe in a transparent system of government, but knowingly never considered the simple principles of establishing relatively healthy governance in Afghanistan.

The prevalent government failures created a vacuum in governance that directly affected the increase in insurgency and the loss of the population trust and hope. Bad governance has led to current crisis rather than the strength of the Taliban activities.

Major donors and international financial institutions are increasingly basing their aid and support on the condition that reforms leading to good governance should be undertaken. Today good governance is a prerequisite for sustainable development and economic growth.

Good governance has 8 major characteristics which include participation of citizens, consensus oriented, accountability, transparency, responsibility, efficiency, inclusiveness and the implementation of rule of law. The establishment of these characteristics assures that corruption is minimized. The views of minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most vulnerable in society are heard in decision-making. It is also responsive to the present and future needs of society.

Our agenda for the design of a more responsive and effective government first calls for utmost transparency and accountability. Lack of transparency and accountability directly leads to corruption. The focus of our design is to enact the freedom of information act so that access to government information becomes easier and widespread.

In order to be able to systematically diagnose the prevailing problems in each government department, a three-month government exercise where every department identifies faults and wastage areas and so on, about other departments will be performed. We are using the elementary psychology where we usually identify other people's fault much easier.

Following the identification of the faults within each department, a three-month exercise to get feedback about their performance from the public will be executed.

Based on the diagnostics, procedures will be simplified to cut delays and red-tape in government processes and to meet people's expectations. Cutting out layers and intermediaries and making things transparent and government officials and workers accountable will result in speeding up government processes.

Our plan for establishing good governance is based on our partnership with the Afghan people and with close cooperation and collaboration with the international community.

Our plan will include harmonization of traditional and modern governance values and structures, traditional courts and jirgas, media, freedom of information, parliamentary effectiveness, peace building and conflict resolution, land tenure and administration, capacity building and good governance indicators.

We do understand that good governance is difficult to achieve in its totality. However, to ensure sustainable human development, actions will be taken to work towards this ideal with the aim of making it a reality.

*We are seeking an Afghanistan that is fully respected for the quality of its governance, commitment to democratic values, the sustainable management of its affairs and resources, and for its defence, support and promotion of human rights.*

The dreams of bringing peace and prosperity back to Afghanistan can not be materialized if corruption continues to destroy our society.

Afghanistan's rich culture and heritage and its spiritual and religious outlook makes it a unique case. However, in spite of all this, corruption has thrived in Afghanistan as never before. Look everywhere whether it is the public sector, private sector, the government, the judiciary and even the security sector, none of them can stand up and say that we are not corrupt. It isn't just the public sector where corruption thrives but the entire society. The person who offers the bribe is equally corrupt as the person who accepts it. Corruption is not just a public sector issue. As a frequent source of bribes for public officials, the private sector shares responsibility for corruption.

Afghanistan can learn greatly from the experiences of other countries in their fight against corruption. Singapore is a good example where the Afghan fight against corruption can gain significantly from it. The reason is that in the late 1950s to early 1960s Singapore shared many important similarities with Afghanistan such as: painful nation-building process in a difficult geopolitical environment, corrupt civil service, and a multi-ethnic society. The Singapore model can be utilized by adjusting its certain components to local needs and conditions.

Singapore has a very sound anti-corruption framework, with strong emphases on the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases. We will use the Singapore successful model to carry out corruption cases independently and without fear, with the Anti Corruption Agency, Attorney General's Chambers and courts each professionally discharging their functions. The laws and codes of conduct and discipline will be fully implemented.

The fear of detection is the most effective weapon we have against corruption. Singapore has ruthlessly enforced anti-corruption laws and that is what we too need to do. Doing this requires giving precedence to strength of character over everything else.

Because leadership is of such critical importance in the anticorruption struggle, a talented manager will be appointed. This manager should have impeccable and widely recognized integrity, a track record of sticking to a job and showing results, and the ability to communicate well with a wide public audience. To drive forward the anticorruption strategy and agenda, the manager will be given the support of a strong organization and adequate resources. The manager's mandate would involve spearheading the anti-corruption efforts and coordinating a variety of agencies and groups involved in the effort.

To advise the government on its anticorruption strategy and monitor progress on a regular basis, a multi-sect oral advisory group of national and international experts will be set up. This group will include prominent Afghan citizens who represent civil society efforts to combat corruption.

Efforts will be made to establish a proactive partnership with civil society institutions to monitor government performance and to encourage the private sector to improve its own behavior.

We will make sure from the first day we take office that every dollar of revenue and foreign donations would be properly accounted for and would reach the beneficiaries at the grass roots fully, without being siphoned off along the way. We are determined that from the beginning of our administration to give special attention to the areas where discretionary powers might be exploited for personal gain and will sharpen the instruments that can prevent, detect or deter such practices.

We are certainly going to strengthen the laws creating a powerful agency charged with fighting corruption. This agency will be granted wide ranging powers to investigate and prosecute suspects. Thus, we are committed to lead by example and to be held accountable by our own rules and high standards.

The government has to prove that it is sincere in its fight against corruption, and society has to get rid of the belief that fighting corruption is an exclusive function of the state.

The less governance model seems to be what Afghanistan needs to move forward. Afghanistan has a healthy many thousand year old tradition of council based democracy where governance did not mean some top chief oversee the people from Kabul or Kandahar, but a series of 'concentric governments' that had the village and tribe at its center. The nature of our today's political system gave us a sluggish government where getting anything done for the common man without 'money' has become next to impossible.

The concentration of too much power in too few hands increases the chances of power being misused and manipulated for vested interests, totally bypassing the greater common good. Our aim is to decentralize. In urban areas, we will implement laws to make the neighborhood committee the first municipality. Empowering the people and putting them in charge of their own neighborhood will reduce corruption as well as make administration more effective.

*I would like to take this opportunity once more to reiterate the commitment of my team to honest, transparent and accountable government and our determination to act against anybody who transgresses these norms.*

**We are determined to give the country a new lease of life!**

## Dr Ghana

Good governance, anti-corruption, citizen rights, rule of law, delivery of services, accountability to citizens—as detailed in Ghana’s ten year report.

### Goverance Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: accountable, honest political representation of the Afghan people

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	1/10	2/10	3/10

Rational: Karzai’s governance policy lacks specifics and fails to address US interference in Afghanistan’s internal matters. Abdullah emphasizes anti-corruption in government, while catering to US interests through advocacy of a parliamentary system and good governance as defined by the US. Ghana has the most detailed plan for governance, but again it caters to the US interests.

# Social

## Hamid Karzai

Empower women, equality of education, national advocacy for women  
Counter narcotics—eradication, promote alternative lifestyles  
Social protection for vulnerable people—women, poor, refugees  
Promote human rights

## Dr. Abdullah Abdullah

Afghanistan after almost eight years still faces daunting challenges such as deteriorating security, un-effective and unaccountable government, slow economic development and increased poverty.

Today, we are witnessing that the current administration, under President Hamid Karzai, do not take into consideration the plight of the poor Afghan people who constitute a significant part of our society.

In the last seven years the first of the economic development process has been completed. We at this point clearly understand the successes and failures of the policies adopted so far. Aside from the implementation of some projects, only a limited group of people benefitted from this reform.

According to the national household survey conducted during the summer and autumn of 2005, poverty in Afghanistan (headcount rate) was around 33 percent. A separate survey was conducted in the spring of 2007, which estimated a poverty rate of 42 percent. The poverty profile also indicates that there are large numbers of vulnerable people close to the poverty line who are at risk of falling into poverty in the face of shocks emanating from a variety of sources (for example sickness, conflict, drought, increases in food prices). These surveys indicate that a significant portion of the population falls under the poor category, and the poverty rate has increased in the last few years rather than declining after spending billions of dollars by the international community.

The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), which is a strategy for security, governance, economic growth and poverty reduction, covers the five-year period from 2008 to 2013, and was approved by President Hamid Karzai and his Cabinet on April 21, and submitted to the International Monetary Fund and World Bank as Afghanistan's Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) paper.

While some sector objectives are laid out in this strategy, the “how” of achieving them getting from here to there, is often not specified. In addition, prioritization across sectors is largely missing, and the identified priorities are not clearly linked to poverty reduction. Unfortunately, the poverty profile is not clear about who the poor are, why they are poor and how to address the causes of poverty. Because of this it does not establish an agenda to reduce poverty to which economic, social and other policies should respond in their strategies.

Thus, it can be concluded that the ANDS document is not either pro-poor or strategic. It generally provides a descriptive poverty profile which fails to assess the causes of poverty and fails to define clear poverty reduction targets to which the sector strategies can be held accountable. That is why the document does not provide any plans for how to reduce poverty in Afghanistan.

As part of our agenda for good governance, we will drastically enhance access to useful and vital information which greatly benefits the poor. People will be empowered to realize benefits from the government agencies and programs or redress their grievances by having access to information.

Our strategy under the circumstances calls for a far better economic management where reforms on those measures which will exclusively benefit the poor will be the determining factor. Thus, we will introduce pro-poor economic reforms. This reform calls for fight against corruption, helping the most vulnerable people, increase the literacy rate, creation of employment opportunities and invest significantly in agriculture which is the base of employment for our country. We clearly understand that any policy for reform which would give relief to such a large number of people will be welcomed by the people.

The importance of strengthening the capacity of the Central Statistical Office (CSO) to provide accurate and timely information on macroeconomic and social indicators are well understood. In the near term it will be important to develop—building on the earlier Statistical Master Plan—and start implementing a strategy for strengthening the CSO, while progressively broadening the coverage and reliability of the statistical base.

The rampant corruption affects the life of poorest in the country. As an example, corruption is estimated to cause loss of millions of afghani per year to the street vendors of Kabul and other major cities. The vendors, who constitute the poorest of the society, are deprived of a chance to bring improvement to their lives because of the corruption.

As part of our plan for poverty reduction we will also make an assessment of the entire country and identify those places which are remote or prone to famine. Then within eighteen month time-bound the country will have a whole network of grain banks. Each grain bank depending on the circumstances will carry between 50 to 250 tones. The creation of this infrastructure can be funded from the National Solidarity Program (NSP) or directly from the government's budget. However, our plan calls for the free distribution of food grains to the people during difficult circumstances. This approach not only will benefit the neediest of the society but also help to stabilize the price of food grains and benefit the fight against narcotics.

Let us not forget that providing food free to those who cannot afford to pay has always been part of our Afghan culture.

Education is the route for a viable democracy as well as economic development. Our plan for poverty reduction and creation of job opportunities calls for focus on primary education. After all, unemployment is a national problem. Look at the millions of dollars being spent under the National Solidarity Program. Why can't we say that the unemployed educated youth can become teachers, and give tuitions to the students in villages? The reasons for this idea are: (a) the fund will be better used; and (b) there will also be a direct link between efforts for reduction of unemployment and illiteracy.

The unemployed youths will get jobs. Since the class room and the place to stay for the teachers will be provided by the community in return for the payment of tuition fee per child by the government the cost of creating employment will not be an overburden for the government. Thus, this proposed initiative will tackle to some degree both the problem of illiteracy and unemployment.

Afghanistan did record GDP growth in the last few years but saw relatively little poverty reduction during this period. One reason is that growth was driven primarily by services (skilled labor intensive) and some construction projects. This led to little formal sector unemployment; most of the growth was due to capital deepening. If growth in agriculture had been higher, poverty could have fallen more. So higher agricultural growth may have a larger impact on poverty reduction than higher, economy-wide growth. Thus, as noted earlier, our economic reforms call for a significant investment in agricultural sector, which has the potential to create employment for thousands of people.

We believe that Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) should measure poverty in the country, identify goals for reducing poverty, and create a spending and policy program for reaching those goals. Our goal is that government should develop its PRS with input from representatives of the general public, or “civil society.” Our objective for the implementation of PRS includes the critical role of monitoring and evaluation in gathering evidence of the country’s progress towards achievement of the pre-defined goals.

*We will set up a PRS Monitoring and Evaluation Unit to work with other government agencies, civil society, community groups, NGOs and the donor community to implement a broad-based PRS Monitoring and Evaluation strategy to help poverty reduction in the country.*

We are determined to implement pro-poor economic development reforms and to reduce poverty in Afghanistan!

Unfortunately, drug narcotics consists a significant part of the Afghan economy. Based on the UNODC’s 2008 report, drug exports had a potential value of about \$3.4 billion compared with an estimated \$ 10.2 billion of GDP. However, the street value of drugs exported to Europe is between 10 to 20 times higher.

We believe that there are well established integrated international networks managing production, transportation and distribution. The existence of this establishment makes the fight against narcotics not only an afghan fight but also a global fight.

However, the current Afghan Administration under President Hamid Karzai not only has not committed itself to fighting drug production in a more calculated manner, its lack of good governance and rampant corruption has helped the drug mafia to finance and manage the production of narcotics in Afghanistan without any fear of persecution or discrimination. The corrupted individuals within the government and lack of serious and committed anti drug policy not only encourages the increase in narcotic trafficking, but also undermines the legitimate Afghan agriculture which in turn undermines the entire system.

The huge profits from the narcotics leads to vested interests in instability. Thus, the vicious cycle of weak governance, opium cultivation and instability is ongoing. Narcotics provide the financial basis of the Taliban activities. Taliban not only protect the

trafficking networks, they are also collecting at least 10 percent in direct taxes from the cultivators providing two to three hundred million dollars each year to them. Thus, drug production in Afghanistan weakens public trust in government and provides fuel for the Taliban expansion.

A well designed counter-narcotics strategy is therefore warranted. The essence of this strategy would be absolute intolerance against drug dealers and people involved in drug trafficking. An anti narcotics act will be enacted where lenience against drug traffickers will be replaced to utmost punishments. “One strike your out” policy will be utilized against the government officials and other offenders. The minimum punishment for the first timers will be no less than 10 years. The drug trafficking will be looked at as a criminal act of highest degree punishable by minimum of 10 years to life imprisonment.

*As a candidate, I am dedicated and very keen to fight drug narcotics in Afghanistan by establishing the rule of law with zero tolerance against drug traffickers and their associates within the government. However, the farmers involved in the cultivation of opium will be provided with the alternative to opium and the support to the farmers is an essential and integrated element of my economic development policy.*

We are determined to clean Afghanistan of Narcotics!

Summary:

Anti-narcotics, reduce poverty

## Dr. Ghana

Citizen rights, fight narcotic’s trade—detailed in ten year report.

### Social Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: sound social policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs of Afghanistan and makes economic sense.

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	4/10	3/10	3/10

Rational: None of the candidates address the social distress from the US occupation of Afghanistan. All the candidates address narcotics issue and citizen or human rights. Karzai is the only candidate to address women rights, though Ghana addresses them through employment initiatives of women.

The social policies of all three candidates are a reflection of US interests.  
Karzai has the most specific social policy of the three candidates.  
Both Abdullah and Ghana are focused on the poor through economic initiatives, and citizen rights, and government accountability.

# Health

## Hamid Karzai

Promote health and nutrition hospitals, disease control

## Dr. Abdullah

No defined health policy

## Dr. Ghana

No defined health policy

### Health Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: sound health care policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs of Afghans and makes economic sense.

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	3/10	0/10	0/10

Rational: Karzai's health policy lacks specifics. Though the Abdullah and Ghana's reform policies will have indirect effect on the health Afghans, these candidates do not have concrete health policies.

# Education

## Hamid Karzai

Education of women, education development at primary, secondary, and higher level

## Dr. Abdullah

Education is the route for a viable democracy as well as economic development. Our plan for poverty reduction and creation of job opportunities calls for focus on primary education. After all, unemployment is a national problem. Look at the millions of dollars being spent under the National Solidarity Program. Why can't we say that the unemployed educated youth can become teachers, and give tuitions to the students in villages? The reasons for this idea are: (a) the fund will be better used; and (b) there will also be a direct link between efforts for reduction of unemployment and illiteracy.

## Dr. Ghana

Improve education in rural areas.

Develop vocational and higher education

### Education Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: sound education policy for Afghanistan, which meets the needs Afghans and makes economic sense

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	4/10	3/10	4/10

Rational: The education policies of the three candidates lack specifics. Ghana and Karzi's policies are more comprehensive than Abdullah, by including vocational and women education.

## Environment

### Hamid Karzai

No stated environmental policies

### Dr. Abdullah

No stated environmental policy

### Dr. Ghana

No stated environmental policy—though mentions the promotion of wind power and other renewable resources, and at the same time hydro development.

Very pro-development.

### Environment Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: more responsible, sustainable management of the Afghanistan environment

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	0/10	0/10	0/10

Rational: None of the candidates have concrete environmental policies. The poverty of Afghanistan does not justify environmental harm to Afghanistan.

# National Security

## Hamid Karzai

Regional cooperation—member of MOFA organization  
Develop national defense  
Improve internal security and policing  
De-mining  
Disband illegal armed groups  
Promote talks with Taliban

## Dr. Abdullah

To combat the Taliban, Abdullah says, the first step is for the elected government not to lose the support of the people as a whole.

"By losing support, the insurgency is strengthened. The people don't see a prospect under the current circumstances. That's why when there is a window of opportunity during the upcoming elections, they see a hope for change.

## Dr. Ghana

Continued US occupation and dependency, defeat of Taliban, roadmap for exit of US forces, handbook for western troops conduct.  
Promoting the US interests in Afghanistan.

### National Security Evaluation:

Basis for evaluation: sound, responsible use of Afghanistan resources and military personnel in Afghanistan lands.

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
	2/10	1/10	1/10

Rational: All three candidates favor US occupation of Afghanistan and promotion of US interests in Afghanistan, and the use of Afghan resources and personal to pursue the US interests and their own personal interests.

Karzai is more willing than the other candidates to work with the Taliban.

Ghani's handbook is weak and simply a means to appease Afghans, because the US troops are guided by their own internal code of conducts.

Because all three candidates are set on expanding the power of the US supported government, internal conflict will continue.

The logical way forward for the well-being of Afghans is for the US and foreign troops to vacate Afghanistan, and then allow Afghans resolve their internal issues themselves. A condition for withdrawal of US troops is conciliation between the current government and the Taliban.

## Overall Results

Score	Hamid Karzai	Dr. Abdullah	Dr. Ghana
Candidates:			
Background	4.9/10	5/10	5/10
Vision	2/10	2/10	2/10
Incumbency	2/10		
Totals for Candidates:	8.9/30 (29.7%)	7/20 (35%)	7/20 (35%)
Policies:			
Economic	1/10	2/10	2/10
Goverance	1/10	2/10	3/10
Social	4/10	3/10	3/10
Health	3/10	0/10	0/10
Education	4/10	3/10	4/10
Environment	0/10	0/10	0/10
National Security	2/10	1/10	1/10
Totals for Policies:	15/70 (21.4%)	11/70 (15.7%)	13/70 (18.6%)
Overall Total Scores:			
Candidates	8.9/30	7/20	7/20
Policies	15/70	11/70	13/70
Totals:	23.9/100 23.9%	18/90 20%	20/90 22.2%

## Overall Ranking:

1. Hamid Karzai (23.9% grade—F grade)
2. Dr. Ghana (22.2% grade—F grade)
3. Dr. Abdullah (20% grade—F grade)

F grade refers to unsatisfactory candidate in terms of representing the relevant population group. The lower the failing grade, the more unsatisfactory the candidate is.

## Analysis

The three Afghanistan presidential candidates received the lowest grades, since the inception of FDA ranking and grading of the political candidates two years ago.

The three candidates received failing grades in both the candidate and policy sections. The grades were between 15% to 44.3% from a passing grade. The closest to a passing grade were Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ghana in the candidate section who were 15% points from a passing grade.

The differences in overall grades between the candidates were marginal with only 3.9% separating them.

The only passing grades received were in the background section for Dr. Abdullah and Dr. Ghana, who both received a C grade (barely satisfactory).

## Conclusion

The very low failing grades for the three presidential candidates show that

1. Hamid Karzia, Dr. Abdullah, and Dr. Ghana are extremely unsatisfactory presidential candidates.
2. The three candidates are highly detrimental to the overall well-being of the Afghanistan people.

From the perspective of the US government, the three candidates are likely extremely satisfactory since they represent US interests in Afghanistan.

Overall, the fact that the US government is allowing a presidential election in a wartime situation, raises questions regarding the legitimacy of the election and the intention of the US nation building in Afghanistan.

If democracy was at the forefront, the presidential election would be postponed until peaceful conditions were established. However, it is clear to the FDA that the US government is using a semblance of democracy in Afghanistan as part of its war effort. Viz., democracy is being used as a means to cover US control of Afghanistan government and ultimately the people of Afghanistan. The failure of this policy is that the US credibility as a promoter of democracy is undermined, and any US backed government and election is deemed illegitimate under the occupation and wartime situation.

An honest and democratic friendly policy would be to have a US backed interim government, until peace is established in Afghanistan.